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I. INTRODUCTION 
"Safety First" has always been a core principle in transport 
industries, even if it has been analyzed and concretely declined 
into different safety approaches and standards in the aeronautics, 
railway and automotive domains. Several key standards have 
emerged over time, mainly focusing on how to engineer safe 
systems [2][4]. With the increased role of software in dependable 
systems, the question "How to engineer safe software?" has been 
addressed as well (in most cases from the point of view of the 
system integrating the software)[2][3]. 
Data-driven approaches have emerged with the rise of the 
Internet and the digital transformation in almost every domain. 
Even if the Big Data real innovations (e.g. easier development 
and operations of distributed systems at scale, releasing 
sometimes unnecessary constraints with eventual consistency…) 
have been turned into a hype, there is no doubt that in many 
domains data is considered as a key asset for the organizations 
that can collect them. A key asset that can be leveraged as a 
competitive advantage and a defensibility against competitors.  
We propose to address the following basic questions: 
• What is (and will be) the role (and the importance) of data 
in the future automotive applications? For sure data could 
harm those systems. But could data also bring benefits? 
• How to address the rise of data in dependable systems? 
Are existing safety standards for systems and software 
ready to integrate the new data-driven stakes? 
II. DEFINITIONS 
In our analysis, we use the following definitions for 
Information and Data (according to [1]): 
• Information: knowledge concerning objects, such as 
facts, events, things, processes, or ideas, including 
concepts, that within a certain context has a particular 
meaning. 
• Data: a reinterpretable representation of information in a 
formalized manner suitable for communication, 
interpretation, or processing. 
That notably means that in our analysis information concern 
both humans and machines, while data apply to information that 
has been digitalized to be managed by machines (including in a 
human-understandable way). 
III. CONTEXT AND ASSUMPTIONS 
We list here the assumptions that we have chosen neither to 
describe with details nor to justify in this short paper. They could 
of course still be discussed and formalized in a longer version of 
this article. 
(1) The future of mobility (and thus the future of 
automotive) implies more automated driving and 
autonomous vehicles – and a key motivation for that is 
the expected improved Road Traffic Safety. 
(2) The future of mobility implies connected vehicles. 
Beyond single vehicles, connectivity drastically 
increases the complexity of the involved systems, 
dealing with interactions between thousands or even 
millions of vehicles and infrastructures systems. 
(3) Beyond the automation and the connectivity, the 
(digital) cooperation between people, vehicles and 
infrastructures is key for Intelligent Transportation 
Systems. With regards to the impacts for safety, it brings 
unprecedented complexity levels on the challenge side, 
but also redundancy and other opportunities. 
IV. STATE OF THE ART IN DATA SAFETY 
We have initiated an analysis of current standards that could 
contribute to the definition of data safety. Multiple topics are 
covered, for instance: 
• Standards dedicated to the connected vehicles [9] or 
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) (ISO TC 211, 
ISO TC 204, CEN TC 278, CEN TC 226) 
• Standards dedicated to maps, e.g. from the Open 
AutoDrive Forum (OADF) 
• Standards addressing data quality [6][7][8] 
• The data safety guidance [11] 
• Data standards used in other domains (i.e. [10]) 
A very (very!) rough conclusion of this first analysis could 
be expressed as follows: existing standards for data don’t address 
safety stakes beyond data quality and existing safety standards 
for automotive (and more generally dependable) systems don’t 
address modern data stakes.  For these standards, we identify as 
a limit the fact that the data safety is only considered as a result 
of its processing by systems, and that nothing is established on 
the information that it contains, or on which it is based. 
V. A SIMPLE INFORMATION FLOWS MODEL FOR ROAD 
TRAFFIC SAFETY 
A. Road Traffic Safety is not only about road vehicles 
It would be a mistake to consider that vehicles should be the 
unique way of improving the road traffic safety. As increasing 
automation necessarily involves that humans do less things, it 
seems natural to consider the safety as a whole, including the 
way we currently deal with human faults (using a mobile phone 
while driving for instance) but also the human intelligence that 
in some cases is the last and unique way to prevent accidents. 
More generally Road Traffic Safety depends on multiple actors 
and information, not only vehicles! For instance: 
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• Road users: drivers in/with a vehicle, but also 
pedestrians, animals 
• Regulations concerning drivers: driving license, 
restrictions related to alcohol, drugs or mobile phones. 
• Regulations concerning vehicles for their safety, 
emissions, etc. Attached to mandatory vehicle 
inspections in many countries. 
• Road Infrastructures: road signs, safety barriers, speed 
bumps, etc. 
B. A very simple Information (data) flows model as a starting 
point 
In our context of more automated vehicles and holistic road 
traffic safety, we considered a deliberately simple model to 
identify the information flows that are involved in driving 
activities (Figure 1). 
The driver and the vehicle working together form a man-machine 
system that is critical for the safety of the transportation. In 
his/her driving activities, the driver mainly analyses the 
environment (including the other vehicles), monitors 
information produced by his/her vehicle, and acts on the vehicle 
to adapt his/her trajectory and more generally behavior.  
Historically, the vehicle has been helping the driver to sense 
the environment (with wipers and lights for instance) and to 
enforce the relevance and the compliance of his/her behavior 
(comply with speed limits, stop when a fault is detected). More 
recently, vehicles have developed the ability to sense 
information from the environment, providing support to the 
driving activities, and in some cases targeting "suprahuman" 
sensing capabilities in specific domains (e.g. radar sensing). 
C. Can we separate (human) intelligence from information? 
Exploring the dynamics of the previous model, and still 
considering that the human driver keeps making the main 
decisions regarding the driving activities, it appears that there's a 
whole class of knowledge (information) that are involved into the 
human decision-making process. Example of information that 
fall into that category are: 
• Laws & regulations: common (in the sense of 
international) and country-specific driving rules (checked 
with a driving license). 
• Information learned by drivers through their driving 
experience, which could improve the driver's ability to 
anticipate hazards…and also reduce driving attention and 
discipline during routine, daily trips. 
• All the softer rules, social contracts and human 
judgments, for instance the ones that regulate heavy 
congested situations, leaving way to another vehicle even 
though driving rules don't say so. 
D. What about all the data that are produced and processed 
in vehicles? 
In a similar way than the fact that there are a lot of pieces 
information behind the human intelligence, there are a lot of data 
in vehicles to ensure its expected (and safe) behavior. Using 
those data for other purposes outside of the vehicle – and 
complying to laws and regulations like GDPR – is at the core of 
our motivation for our work. 
E. Mapping Road Traffic Safety to our simple information 
flow model 
Starting with our simple information flow model, what can 
we say about the safety questions that arise for each information 
flow? The Figure 2 gives a few examples: 
As explained previously, Road Traffic Safety includes a very 
wide scope of questions in multiple domains (driver, 
infrastructures, vehicles). What we see also is that a very high 
diversity on information types is involved, including ones that 
are - for now - only accessible to humans. That concerns 
especially soft rules and social contracts. By the way, we can 
consider the safety itself as a social contract, mixing acceptable 
safety for the population, and eventual negotiations between 
stakeholders. 
VI. PROPOSED APPROACH & NEXT STEPS 
A. Data outside of Systems 
It can be deduced from assumption (1) that in order to 
improve safety, a certain amount of information currently 
managed by the human driver must be handled by the vehicle. 
However, this transfer is accompanied by a considerable increase 
in the complexity of the resulting system, as we can guess from 
“V. A simple information flows model for Road Traffic Safety”. 
Indeed, whether to manage the anticipation of events that will be 
encountered on the route (see beyond the horizon), or access 
knowledge about the weather and its consequences on traffic or 
driving conditions, or driving rules, including temporary or 
implicit rules of conduct, the car is necessarily connected. This 
extension of the information to be managed creates complexity, 
as we have stated in assumption (2).  
However, this new complexity is hardly compatible for us 
with the analysis and design of systems, including system of 
systems, as it is traditionally done: by defining a system at the 
highest level, and by breaking it down by refinement to products 
at lower levels, including equipments inside a vehicle. 
Moreover: this approach would very quickly meet another 
limitation: the differences of life cycles between the components 
of this giga-system, which means that some are operated even 
before others are defined. 
To face up this complexity, we propose to reason directly on 
the information, and to apply a safety-oriented thinking on this 
flow of information. This inverts the common approach of 
 
Figure 1: A simple model for Information flows in driving activities 
 
 
Figure 2: Examples of safety-related questions mapped to 
information flows 
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system engineering, proposing to build confidence based on 
information first, and system second, instead of the contrary.  
This results in the data being considered as being outside of 
the systems. 
This point of view is a way to answer to the limit previously 
highlighted at the end of “IV-State of the art in data safety”. By 
the way, it enables the decoupling between systems that produce, 
consume or manage data, necessary to address the differences of 
lifecycle stated above. 
This approach enables to consider end-to-end chains of trust, 
from the sensing/production of data to the consumption of 
knowledge. It relies on introducing transverse data checkpoints 
in the chain that enable systems to have their own different 
lifecycles and characteristics, while establishing confidence for 
the whole chain. 
 
This approach is not replacing the traditional way of dealing 
with data inside systems (and software). It comes in addition to 
the system-driven approaches, characterized by the following 
property: the trust we can have in data at system run-time comes 
from the trust we have in the system at development time. 
B. The “Minimum Viable Chain of Trust” that combines 
Systems & Data 
Following our principle to decouple systems using data 
checkpoints, we propose the following minimum viable chain of 
trust that combines systems and data (Figure 4): 
• Sensing Systems can be embedded in vehicles or in 
infrastructures. Logging systems, even not attached to 
physical sensors, are considered as sensing systems in our 
analysis. 
• Sensing systems are the main sources of data, as 
Observations, for which we strongly propose that they 
should be considered outside of the system that have 
generated them, with their own quality and safety 
attributes. 
• Systems of Insights or Systems of Intelligence that turn 
multiple input data (Observations) into new data 
(Knowledge) with additional value. This knowledge 
generation happens according to its own lifecycle, 
different from the lifecycles of the observations. 
• The different kinds of knowledge produced by the 
Systems of Intelligence are also to be considered apart, 
like observations. 
• Data- & AI-powered systems & services represent the 
last link of the chain in the context of connected 
vehicles. They consume knowledge, once again 
according to their own lifecycle. A typical example is 
Advanced Driving Assistance Systems (ADAS) that 
work according to their own “Sense, Plan, Act” 
operation principle, the knowledge being “plugged” to 
the “Plan” phase, enabling intelligence. Indeed, this 
knowledge has been elaborated through the collection of 
observations, which are senses of other vehicles, and a 
fusion and compilation of these observation to a 
knowledge, which is a sort of collective intelligence. 
C. Safe Data 
A key objective regarding data safety is to define what safe 
data (and safe knowledge) could mean. The quality attributes of 
the data are naturally essential for this, using for example the 
characteristics defined in [7]. For data close to sensors 
(observations), those attributes are directly linked to the 
characteristics of the sensing system that has produced the data. 
For instance, it seems safe to collect observations stating that 
a vehicle has detected a loss of traction for one or more of its 
tires (skidding) through its Electronic Stability Control (ESC) 
system. 
The problem is much more difficult when considering the 
distilled, transformed data (knowledge). The value of the 
knowledge should be defined, and the core work to do on data 
safety is precisely on this topic. Among the ideas that could be 
considered (non-exhaustive list): 
• the quantity (diversity, representativity) and quality of 
source data is of high influence. 
• the complexity of the algorithm mixing the source data 
can influence the final quality. 
• a probability of error should be introduced, for instance 
when the distillation uses stochastic models (and 
distinguish false positive and false negative is key). 
Keeping the same previous example, would it still be safe to 
consolidate all the skidding observations from multiple vehicle 
into a slippery road conditions warning? Would additional 
information be needed or relevant (like the temperature to help 
explain that there may be ice on the road)? When would it be safe 
to predict that the ice may be gone? What if a vehicle does not 
detect skidding at this location? How to differentiate ice from oil 
as a cause to slippery road conditions? 
Let’s assume that we could build a “map” of all those kinds 
of events, on which criteria could we consider that it’s safe for a 
vehicle to drive autonomously? Obviously, the positive impacts 
and benefits from additional knowledge must be balanced with 
the risks of making decisions based on erroneous information. 
This balance exercise directly helps in the definition of the 
operation design domain (ODD) defined in [5].  
Additionally, in the context of autonomous driving, the 
location of geographical information is clearly safety-related. 
Then the choice of how the location is established (including the 
physical mean), and the way that this location is represented by 
data will directly enter in the confidence level of the geographic 
information.  
For example, a speed limit can be attached to a large road 
segment, based on the location of the speed limit sign which can 
be approximative (5-meter accuracy); on the other side, the 
curvature of a bend must be precisely located, and this location 
properly described (center of curvature, special points of the 
curve, etc.).  
In other words, we can imagine an approach of the safety 
design centered on data: the exercise would consist in choosing 
which data is necessary to enhance the safety of a transport 
function (for example), considering all the valuable data, 
fostering the usage of available data, pushing the collection of 
other new data, evaluating the confidence potentially associated 
to these data, and the ways of mitigating the potential lack of 
confidence by another loop in this data investigation, or by 
alternative means (i.e. usage of another known subsystem). 
 
Figure 3 - Data not in systems 
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D. Adapt standards for systems that produce, consume, store 
or transfer safe data 
For simplification purposes, our minimum viable chain of 
trust deliberately omits telecommunication systems that transfer 
data between systems, and storage/access systems that enable 
lifecycles to be decoupled. We believe that the traditional quality 
criteria such as integrity, availability, confidentiality, lineage and 
response times provide the right foundation so that those systems 
deal with safe data, but further analyses are yet to be conducted. 
Our minimum viable chain of trust also describes only the 
case when the last link of the chain is a in-vehicle system (that 
can rely on off-board knowledge). For that case and more 
generally for all in-vehicle systems, the safety analysis context 
is the one defined by [2] and [5].  
A key question is then “What does it mean for an automotive 
system [2] or intended function [5] to consume safe data or 
knowledge?” 
To answer that question, it’s crucial to come back to the 
objectives of the last link of the chain, the actual use case. Using 
the same weather information for optimizing the energy 
consumption on one hand and for “calibrating” an emergency 
braking system on the other hand defines two distinct safety 
contexts. We believe that we have to introduce some levels of 
safety for data in order to address this point: depending on its 
usage by the critical system or function, a data item must have a 
minimum level of safety corresponding to the criticity. 
E. Define Safety for Systems of Intelligence 
Systems of Intelligence produce safe data (or knowledge). 
They rely on principles and approaches (cloud computing, 
distributed systems with specific fault-tolerance solutions, AI, 
crowdsourcing…) for which there is no or a little experience 
regarding safety analyses. 
We believe that a new area should be opened for the safety 
of those systems. Two aspects at least should be studied – and 
balanced: how to make those systems reliable and robust enough, 
and how to make them produce safe data. 
VII. CONCLUSION: OUR VISION FOR DATA SAFETY 
We have seen that the changing mobility landscape invites to 
reconsider some aspects of global road traffic safety. Among 
them, visit and challenge the way data interacts with safety 
seems to be promising. 
On the one hand, to enhance safety, we need more 
information to give more autonomy to systems, but without 
losing the huge adaptation abilities of humans. This leads us to 
ask if safety activities should go from a system-centric view to a 
data-centric view. Doing so would open the opportunity to build 
a safety based on decoupled systems, allowing a high level of 
complexity and dynamic configuration, based on the idea that 
more and better data means more confidence. The obvious 
condition to that benefit is that the initial data (the observations) 
are to be produced with a known level of confidence. 
On the other hand, there is a lot of work to make this shift 
happen! As any novelty in the quite conservative world of safety, 
we must show that the new introduced risks are positively 
balanced by the overall safety enhancement. At the heart of the 
problem, we must elaborate the rules, the guidance to build safe 
data (knowledge) based on source data (observations). We must 
build new criteria and measures, study how they could be linked 
to existing standards (for system and software). Finally, we must 
see which types and which level of rules and standardization 
would best fit systems of intelligence.  
This work cannot be achieved by a single enterprise, it 
requires a whole community, and more than that: a new whole 
community! A community bridging the gap between (at least) 
two different worlds: the data-digital-web-IT world and the 
system-and-safety world. 
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Figure 4: The “Minimum Viable Chain of Trust” that combines Systems & Data 
